Abstract: Deniable authentication protocols enable a sender to authenticate a message to a receiver such that the receiver is unable to prove the identity of the sender to a third party. In contrast to interactive schemes, non-interactive deniable authentication schemes improve communication efficiency. Currently, several non-interactive deniable authentication schemes have been proposed with provable security in the random oracle model. In this paper, we study the problem of constructing non-interactive deniable authentication scheme secure in the standard model without bilinear groups. An efficient non-interactive deniable authentication scheme is presented by combining the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol with authenticated encryption schemes. We prove the security of our scheme by sequences of games and show that the computational cost of our construction can be dramatically reduced by applying pre-computation technique.
by the amount of time and computational power available.
Susilo et al. [21] provided generic constructions for non-interactive deniable ring authentication via ring signature and chameleon hash function. Strictly speaking, a 2-user ring signature schemes is sufficient for their construction to yield a deniable authentication scheme.
However, the existing 2-user ring signature schemes in the standard model are built upon bilinear groups such that they are rather costly to be implemented. For instance, the 2-user ring signature schemes mentioned in [6] and the scheme in [8] require at least 3 pairing operations for verification. As pairing operations require more computational cost than exponentiation operations, it is natural to ask whether we can obtain a more efficient deniable authentication scheme such that the underlying primitives can be instantiated without relying on random oracle as well as bilinear groups. In addition, the use of chameleon hash function in their construction may induce additional computational (e.g., exponentiation operations and an implicit mapping from the output of chameleon hash function to the message domain of ring signature scheme) and communication cost(e.g., the randomness used by chameleon hash function should be included).
Hence the goal of this paper is to design efficient non-interactive deniable authentication schemes secure in the standard model that can be instantiated without bilinear groups. At first, we provide a generic construction for deniable authentication such that the deniability is based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Subsequently, we prove that our construction is secure against impersonation attack under the security model in [22] in the standard model by sequences of games. To prove the unforgeability of our construction, we make use of the notion of integrity of plaintexts from authenticated symmetric encryption.
Finally we compare the efficiency with other non-interactive deniable authentication schemes with provable-security in the random oracle model. The result shows that the performance of our construction is comparable to those non-interactive schemes in terms of the computational cost.
Preliminaries
We denote by k a security parameter. If A is a randomized algorithm, then 
Given random generators 1 2 , g g of k G , consider the following distributions:
For an adversary A , his distinguishing advantage is defined as follows:
We say that DDH assumption hold over the group family
Key Derivation Function
A key derivation function KDF is defined as follows:
We say that KDF is a secure key derivation function if for all PPT adversary A , [4] between an adversary A and a game challenger S is defined as follows:
(1) The challenger S picks an encryption key {0,1} [4] demonstrated that the property of integrity of plaintexts can be achieved by applying the Encrypt-and-MAC composition method to a symmetric encryption scheme and a message authentication scheme.
One-time secure signature
A signature scheme consists of the following algorithms:
(1) Key generation Gen : takes as input the security parameter k and outputs a public key pk and a matching secret key sk . A wins the game if
A signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under a one-time chosen message attack if for all PPT adversary A , the success probability
Adv k of A in the above game is negligible.
Groth's one-time secure signature
Given a group G of order q with generator g and a hash function 
Deniable authentication schemes

Syntax of deniable authentication schemes
A non-interactive deniable authentication scheme consists of the following algorithms [22] :
(1) Setup: Given a security parameter k , generates common system parameters cps.
(2) KeyGen: Given cps, generates a public key pk and a matching secret key sk .
(3) P: Given a message M , the prover runs P( , , ; ) 
Our scheme
Our scheme consists of the following algorithms:
(1) Setup: Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group generated by g with prime order q , A is at least ε .
Game 2
Game 2 is the same as Game 1 except that line I2 in the procedure Init is modified as follows:
Init (1 
By assumption, the right-hand side of the above equation is negligible, which finishes the proof.
Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our construction and other related non-interactive deniable authentication schemes with provable security [22, 24] in terms of the computational cost. The result is stated in Table 1 . Exp denotes an exponentiation operation, which is the most time-consuming operation used in these schemes. For ease of comparison, we use the signature scheme in [12] which is one-time secure in the standard model to instantiate our construction. Note that the computational cost of a prover in our scheme should take the key generation of one-time signature scheme into consideration.
In the table, the computational cost of a multi-exponentiation (that is, computing 1 g g g ) is assumed to be at most 1.5 exponentiations [18] . Although the scheme [24] is more efficient than others, the efficiency of our construction can be further reduced when the key pair of one-time signature scheme can be pre-computed and stored such that only one exponentiation is needed to compute the shared secret ( ) V P x x vk g = . Such pre-computation technique does not apply to the schemes in [22, 24] . Moreover, our scheme is proven to be secure in the standard model which provides stronger security guarantee than the random oracle model. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a generic construction for deniable authentication schemes that can be instantiated without bilinear groups. Deniability of our scheme is achieved by the property of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. In the following, we prove our scheme to be unforgeable in the standard model by sequences of games. In the process of proof, we make use of the notion of integrity of plaintexts with regard to symmetric encryption. Finally we show that the computational cost of our construction can be dramatically reduced by applying pre-computation technique such that the performance of our construction is comparable to the most efficient non-interactive deniable authentication scheme [24] whose security is based on the random oracle model.
